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Abstract
This paper considers prior-independent mechanism design, namely identifying a single mech-
anism that has near optimal performance on every prior distribution. We show that mechanisms
with truthtelling equilibria, a.k.a., revelation mechanisms, do not always give optimal prior-
independent mechanisms and we define the revelation gap to quantify the non-optimality of
revelation mechanisms. This study suggests that it is important to develop a theory for the
design of non-revelation mechanisms.
Our analysis focuses on welfare maximization in single-item auctions for agents with budgets
and a natural regularity assumption on their distribution of values. The all-pay auction (a non-
revelation mechanism) is the Bayesian optimal mechanism; as it is prior-independent it is also
the prior-independent optimal mechanism (a 1-approximation). We prove a lower bound on
the prior-independent approximation of revelation mechanisms of 1.013 and that the clinching
auction (a revelation mechanism) is a prior-independent e ≈ 2.714 approximation. Thus the
revelation gap for single-item welfare maximization with public budget agents is in [1.013, e].
Some of our analyses extend to the revenue objective, position environments, and irregular
distributions.
1 Introduction
The end-to-end principle in distributed systems advocates environment-independent protocols (for
the center) that push environment-specific complexity to the applications (the end points) that use
the protocol (Saltzer et al., 1984). This principle enabled the Internet protocols designed for the
workloads of the 1980s to continue to succeed with workloads of the 2010s. On the other hand,
research in mechanism design (which governs the design of protocols for strategic agents and has
application both in computer science and economics) almost exclusively adheres to the revelation
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principle which suggests the design of mechanisms where each agent’s best strategy is to truthfully
report her preferences. In revelation mechanisms the agents (the end points) have very a simple
“report your true preference” strategies and the mechanism (the center) has the complex task
of finding an outcome that both enforces this truthfulness property and also obtains a desirable
outcome. Unsurprisingly, optimal revelation mechanisms tend to be complex and dependent on
the environment. This paper demonstrates that the end-to-end argument has bite in mechanism
design by showing that non-revelation mechanisms are strictly better than revelation mechanisms
for a canonical mechanism design problem.
In prior-independent mechanism design, it is assumed that the agents’ preferences are drawn
from a distribution that is not known to the designer. The goal of prior-independent mechanism
design is to identify mechanisms that are good approximations to the optimal mechanism that is tai-
lored to the distribution of preferences. Specifically, a mechanism is sought to minimize the ratio of
its expected performance to the expected performance of the optimal mechanism in worst case over
distributions from which the preferences of the agents are drawn. This notion is a standard one that
has been applied to revenue maximization (Dhangwatnotai et al., 2010; Roughgarden et al., 2012;
Fu et al., 2015; Allouah and Besbes, 2018), multi-dimensional mechanism design (Devanur et al.,
2011; Roughgarden et al., 2015), makespan minimization (Chawla et al., 2013), mechanism design
for risk-averse agents (Fu et al., 2013), and mechanism design for agents with interdependent val-
ues (Chawla et al., 2014a). In none of these scenarios is the optimal prior-independent mechanism
known; cf. Fu et al. (2015) and Allouah and Besbes (2018).
The revelation principle suggests that if there is a mechanism with a good equilibrium outcome,
there is a mechanism where truthtelling achieves the same outcome in a truthtelling equilibrium.
Due to the revelation principle, much of the theory of mechanism design is developed for revelation
mechanisms, i.e., ones where truthtelling is an equilibrium. The proof of the revelation principle is
simple: A revelation mechanism can simulate the equilibrium strategies in the non-revelation mech-
anism to obtain the same outcome as a truthtelling equilibrium, i.e., agents report true preferences
to the revelation mechanism, it simulates the agent strategies in the non-revelation mechanism,
and it outputs the outcome of the simulation. For Bayesian non-revelation mechanisms (where the
agents’ preferences are drawn from a prior distribution), the agents’ equilibrium strategies are a
function of the prior and thus the corresponding revelation mechanism constructed via the rev-
elation principle is not prior-independent. Thus, the restriction to revelation mechanisms is not
generally without loss for prior-independent mechanism design. Non-revelation mechanisms, on the
other hand, are widely used in practice and frequently have easily to identify and natural equilibria
(e.g., in rank-based auctions, see Chawla and Hartline, 2013). Our proof of a non-trivial revela-
tion gap – that the prior-independent approximation factor of the best non-revelation mechanism
is better than that of the best revelation mechanism – gives concrete motivation for a theory of
mechanism design without the revelation principle.
It is not hard to invent pathological scenarios where there is a non-trivial revelation gap. In-
stead, this paper considers the canonical environment of welfare maximization for agents with
budgets and shows such a gap even for distributions on preferences that satisfy a standard reg-
ularity property. Moreover, the environment in which we exhibit the revelation gap suggests the
end-to-end principle: the agents can easily implement the optimal outcome in the equilibrium of a
simple mechanism, while revelation mechanisms that satisfy the constraints must be complex and
either prior-dependent or non-optimal.
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Main Results. Our analysis focuses on welfare maximization in a canonical single-item envi-
ronment with ex ante symmetric budget constrained agents, i.e., each agent’s value is drawn in-
dependently and identically from an unknown distribution and the agent cannot make payments
that exceed a known and identical budget (cf. Maskin, 2000). Our main treatment of this problem
will make a simplifying assumption that the distribution follows a regularity property that implies
that the Bayesian optimal mechanism has a nice form (Pai and Vohra, 2014). Our results require
a symmetric environment, i.e., an i.i.d. distribution and identical budget. A number of our re-
sults extend to the objective of revenue (Laffont and Robert, 1996), to position environments as
popularized as a model for ad auctions (Devanur et al., 2013), and beyond regular distributions
(Devanur et al., 2013). For clarity the main results are described first for welfare maximization,
single-item environments, and regularly distributed agent values.
The main challenge in demonstrating a revelation gap is that it is difficult to identify prior-
independent optimal mechanisms, cf. Fu et al. (2015). Though the question has been considered,
the prior literature has no examples of optimal prior-independent mechanisms for non-trivial envi-
ronments. 1 Our non-trivial revelation-gap theorem follows from three results. First, the all-pay
auction (from the literature, defined below) has a unique equilibrium that is Bayesian optimal and
it is prior-independent. Second, we obtain a lower bound on the ability of a prior-independent rev-
elation mechanism to approximate the Bayesian optimal mechanism by identifying the dominant
strategy incentive compatible mechanism that is Bayesian optimal for the uniform distribution.
The performance of this mechanism is strictly worse than that of the Bayesian optimal mechanism
(which is Bayesian incentive compatible); specifically the gap is 1.013. Third, we show that the
dominant strategy incentive compatible clinching auction (from the literature, defined below) is
an e ≈ 2.72 approximation to the Bayesian optimal mechanism. Combining the upper and lower
bounds we see a revelation gap between 1.013 and e. 2 The first result follows naturally from the
literature; the second and third results are the main technical contributions of the paper.
Three auctions are at the forefront of our study. The all-pay auction solicits bids, assigns the
item to the highest agent, and charges all agents their bids. The clinching auction (Ausubel, 2004;
Dobzinski et al., 2008; Goel et al., 2015) is an ascending price auction that can be thought of as
allocating a unit measure of lottery tickets: a price is offered in each stage, each agent specifies
the measure of tickets desired at the given price, each agent is allocated a number of tickets that
is equal to the minimum of her demand and the measure of remaining tickets if this agent is only
allowed to buy tickets after all other agents have bought as much as they desire first. 3 The
middle-ironed clinching auction – which we identify as the optimal dominant strategy incentive
compatible mechanism – behaves like the clinching auction except that values that fall within a
middle range are ironed. The allocation that an agent in this middle range receives is the average
over he original allocation of for middle range values in the clinching auction. This averaging results
in the the budget binding later and more efficient outcomes than in the original clinching auction.
The second step, mentioned above, is to obtain a lower bound on the prior-independent ap-
1Contemporaneously with our results, Allouah and Besbes (2018) showed that the second-price auction is the
prior-independent optimal revelation mechanism for revenue when the agents’ values are distributed according to a
monotone hazard rate distribution.
2To better appreciate the magnitude of this lower bound, notice that it is demonstrated for two agents with
uniformly distributed values where the optimal expected welfare (even without budgets) is is 2/3 and the lottery
mechanism (which gives the item to a random agent) has expected welfare 1/2 and is a 4/3 ≈ 1.33 approximation.
3For example, at a price of 0 all agents would want to buy all the tickets, but the agent that arrives last gets no
tickets, thus no agents get any tickets at this price; the price increases.
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proximation of a revelation mechanism. Our analysis begins with the observation that a prior-
independent revelation mechanism must be Bayesian incentive compatible for every distribution.
For two agents, this condition is equivalent to being dominant strategy incentive compatible. We
ask whether there a gap between the Bayesian optimal dominant strategy and Bayesian incentive
compatible mechanism. The comparison between optimal dominant strategy and Bayesian incen-
tive compatible mechanism is standard for multi-dimensional mechanism design problems, e.g., see
Gershkov et al. (2013) and Yao (2017); we are unaware of previous studies of this phenomenon
for single-dimensional agents with non-linear preferences. We answer this question positively by
writing the dominant strategy mechanism design problem as a linear program and solving it by
identifying a dual solution that proves the optimality of the middle-ironed clinching auction, cf.
Pai and Vohra (2014) and Devanur and Weinberg (2017). The identified gap gives a lower bound
on the approximation factor of the optimal prior-independent mechanism.
The third step, mentioned above, proves that the prior-independent approximation factor of
the clinching auction auction is at most e and resolves in the affirmative an open question from
Devanur et al. (2013). Our proof follows from a novel adaptation of a standard method for ap-
proximation results in mechanism design where an auction’s performance is compared to the upper
bound given by the ex ante relaxation, in this case, the welfare of the optimal mechanism that sells
one item in expectation over the random draws of the agents’ values (i.e., ex ante) rather than
for all draws of the agents’ values (i.e., ex post). This method was introduced by Chawla et al.
(2007), formalized by Alaei (2011, 2014), generalized by Alaei et al. (2013), and employed in many
subsequent analyses.
Extensions. A number of our results extend beyond regular distributions, single-item environ-
ments, and the welfare objective as described above. These extensions all require that the environ-
ment be symmetric, specifically, that the agents’ values are independent and identically distributed
and their budgets are identical.
For irregular distributions the welfare-optimal auction is not generally the all-pay auction;
moreover, it does not generally have a prior-independent implementation. We prove that the
all-pay auction is a prior-independent two approximation. Both the regular and irregular prior-
independent optimality and approximation results for the one-item all-pay auction extend to the
all-pay position auction.
The degradation of the approximation factor by a factor of two for irregular distributions
extends to the single-item clinching auction which is an e approximation for regular distributions
(as described above) and a 2e approximation for irregular distributions.
For the revenue objective (Laffont and Robert, 1996), with appropriate definition of regularity,
the n-agent single-item all-pay auction is a prior-independent n/(n − 1) approximation to the
revenue optimal auction (cf. Bulow and Klemperer, 1996).
Important Directions. The most general direction suggested by this work is for a systematic
development of non-revelation mechanism design. Unfortunately, it is not generally helpful to do
revelation mechanism design and then try to go from the suggested revelation mechanism to a
practical and simple non-revelation mechanism. There is a nascent literature on this topic. Pa-
pers working to develop a theory of non-revelation mechanism design include Chawla and Hartline
(2013), which proves the uniqueness and optimality of equilibria in symmetric rank-based auc-
tions; Chawla et al. (2014b, 2016), which gives data driven methods for optimizing non-revelation
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mechanisms in symmetric environments; and Hartline and Taggart (2016), which gives a theory for
non-revelation sample complexity and the design of approximately optimal non-revelation mecha-
nisms in asymmetric environments.
While the literature has many interesting approximation bounds for prior-independent mecha-
nism design. Rarely have the prior-independent optimal mechanism been identified. Moreover, the
prior-independent approximation factors achievable tend to be surprising; for example, Fu et al.
(2015) show that the second-price action is not the optimal prior-independent mechanisms for two-
agent revenue maximization with agents with regularly distributed values. 4 The literature lacks
general techniques for answering this question.
We have observed that there is a very simple prior-independent optimal mechanism for wel-
fare maximization in symmetric environments for agents with identical budgets. This mechanism,
namely the all-pay auction, achieves its optimal outcome in Bayes-Nash equilibrium. The general
question of identifying prior-independent non-revelation mechanisms that optimize a desired objec-
tive, like welfare or revenue, needs to be asked with care. Without restrictions to this question, it
is asked and answered in the literature on non-parametric implementation theory, see the survey of
Jackson (2001). This literature shows that arbitrarily close approximations, called “virtual imple-
mentations”, to the Bayesian optimal mechanism can be implemented by an uninformed principal.
The mechanisms in this literature tend to be sequential – where agents interact in multiple rounds
– and require agents to make reports about their own preferences and crossreports about their
beliefs on other agents’ preferences. Our perspective on these results is that they take the model of
Bayes-Nash equilibrium too literally and the resulting cross-reporting mechanisms are both fragile
and impractical. One approach for ruling out these mechanisms is to restrict attention to mecha-
nism formats that are commonly occurring in practice. Specifically, in the general winner-pays-bid
format: agents bid, an allocation rule maps bids to a set of winners, and all winners pay their bids;
in the general all-pay format: agents bid, an allocation rule maps bids to a set of winners, and all
agents pay their bids. There may be other restricted formats that are also interesting for specific
scenarios, e.g., the seller-offer mechanisms that are prevalent as real estate exchange mechanisms
(Niazadeh et al., 2014).
Finally, there are still many gaps in our understanding of auctions for identically distributed
agents with common budgets. For welfare, the bounds in this paper show that the clinching
auction’s approximation factor for the welfare objective is in [1.03, e] for regular distributions and
[2, 2e] for irregular distribution. Sharpening these bounds is an open question. Moreover, we
conjecture that the clinching auction is also a prior-independent constant approximation for the
revenue objective (with i.i.d. public-budget regular distributions). We also leave open a number of
questions with regard to the Bayesian optimal dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism
for agents with budgets. We conjecture that the welfare optimality of the middle-ironed clinching
auction extends from uniform distributions to regular distributions. We leave open the question of
a similar result for the revenue objective, even for the special case of uniform distributions. There
are specific issues that prevent straightforward generalization of our approach of using the dual to
certify the optimality of the middle-ironed clinching auction for these questions.
Other Related Work. There is a significant area of research analyzing the performance of
simple non-revelation mechanisms in equilibrium, a.k.a., the price of anarchy. Generally these
4Allouah and Besbes (2018) show that with more restrictive monotone hazard rate distributions, the second-price
auction is an optimal prior-independent revelation mechanism.
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mechanisms are prior-independent and the aim of the literature, e.g. Syrgkanis and Tardos (2013),
is to demonstrate that they are approximately efficient. On the other hand, for welfare maximization
in many of the studied environments, there is a DSIC revelation mechanism that is (exactly) efficient
and, thus, there is no revelation gap. Though this literature focuses on the analysis rather than
the design of mechanisms, two conclusions for mechanism design are: (a) that a simple revenue
covering property is sufficient (Hartline et al., 2014), necessary (Du¨tting and Kesselheim, 2015), and
potentially optimizable; and (b) that this property (and also a more general smoothness property)
is closed under composition, i.e., when multiple independent mechanisms are run simultaneously
(Syrgkanis and Tardos, 2013). For a surveys of these and other results see Roughgarden et al.
(2017) and Chapter 6 of Hartline (2016).
For agents with budgets, approximation mechanisms have been studied from both a design and
analysis perspective for the liquid welfare benchmark proposed by Chawla et al. (2011), Syrgkanis and Tardos
(2013), and Dobzinski and Paes Leme (2014). The liquid welfare benchmark is the optimal surplus
of a feasible allocation when each agent’s contribution to the surplus is the maximum of her value
for her allocation and her budget. These and subsequent papers show that simple mechanisms have
welfare that approximate the liquid welfare benchmark. Unfortunately, when evaluated under the
formal study of benchmarks for mechanism design developed by Hartline and Roughgarden (2008)
and summarized in Chapter 7 of Hartline (2016), the liquid welfare does not satisfy a key property.
Specifically, there are i.i.d. distributions where the expected welfare of the Bayesian optimal mech-
anism is arbitrarily larger than the expected optimal liquid welfare. This bound follows because
liquid welfare is at most the sum of the agent budgets which can be arbitrarily close to zero and,
in such cases, is unrelated to the welfare possible by a mechanism. 5 Thus, testing mechanisms for
their worst-case approximation factor with respect to liquid welfare does not necessarily separate
good mechanisms from bad mechanisms.
Organization. In Section 2 we give the preliminaries of our setup. In Section 3 we analyze the
prior-independent approximation factor of the clinching auction for public-budget regular agents.
In Section 4 we derive the Bayesian optimal DSIC mechanism for two agents with value uniformly
distributed and show it is the middle-ironed clinching auction. In Section 5, we prove that the
revelation gap is a constant. In Section 6, we analyze the prior-independent approximation factor
of the all-pay auction and the clinching auction for irregular agents. In Section 7, we analyze the
approximation ratio of winner-pays-bid mechanisms. In Section 8, we analyze the prior-independent
revenue approximation of the all-pay auction for public-budget regular agents. In Appendix A, we
give an ascending implementation of the clinching auction with price jumps (a generalization of
the middle-ironed clinching auction). In Appendix B, we give a geometric framework for deriving
Bayesian optimal mechanisms for agents with budgets and apply this framework to solve for the
Bayesian optimal winner-pays-bid mechanism.
2 Preliminaries
Model for auctions with budgets We consider mechanisms for agents with independent and
identically distributed values and identical public budgets. The budget is denoted by B. For
5For example, in a single-item environment with budgets identically equal to zero and agent values identically
equal to one (trivially an i.i.d. distribution); the lottery, which allocates the item to a random agent for free, has
welfare one while the liquid welfare is zero.
6
allocation x ∈ [0, 1] and payment p ∈ R, an agent with value v ∈ R has utility vx− p if p is at most
the budget B and utility −∞ otherwise. In other words, the agent cannot under any circumstances
pay more than her budget. The agents’ values are drawn independently and identically from
distribution F with support [0, h].
Denote the strategy function of an agent by s(·) where s(v) is the bid made by the agent
when her value is v. A bid profile is b = (b1, . . . , bn). A mechanism is given by mapping from
bids to allocations and payments which we will denote by x˜(b) = (x˜1(b), · · · , x˜n(b)) and p˜(b) =
(p˜1(b), · · · , p˜n(b)). The outcome of the mechanism (x˜, p˜) and strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn)
on a profile of agent values v is denoted by allocation rule x(v) = x˜(s(v)) and payment rule
p(v) = p˜(s(v)).
The auction designer typically faces a feasibility constraint that restricts the allocations that
can be produced. For example, a single-item auction requires that the number of agents allocated
is at most one, i.e.,
∑
i xi(v) ≤ 1. A position environment generalizes a single item auction and is
given by a sequence of decreasing probabilities w = (w1, . . . , wn) where without loss of generality
the number of positions is equal to the number of agents. The probability that an agent is allocated
if assigned to position j is wj. A mechanism then can assign agents to positions (deterministically
or randomly) and this process and the position probabilities induce allocation probabilities xi(v).
Basic auction theory A Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) in the mechanism (x˜, p˜) is a pro-
file of agent strategies s where each si maps a value to a bid that is a best response to the
other strategies and the common knowledge that values are drawn i.i.d. from distribution F .
The mechanism (x˜, p˜) and strategy profile s induce for each agent an interim allocation rule
xi(v) = Ev−i [xi(v,v−i)]. We will consider only symmetric distributions and symmetric auctions.
In such auctions, Chawla and Hartline (2013) show that all equilibria are symmetric, thus it is
without loss to drop the subscript and refer to the interim allocation rule and payment rule as
(x, p). The Myerson (1981) characterization of BNE requires that (a) the interim allocation x(v)
is monotone non-decreasing and (b) the interim payment p(v) = v · x(v) −
∫ v
0 x(t) dt. Condition
(b) is known as the payment identity. A mechanism is Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) if it
induces a BNE where each agents strategy is reporting her value truthfully. A mechanism is interim
individual rational (IIR) if the interim allocation is non-negative for all value.
A dominant strategy equilibrium (DSE) in the mechanism (x˜, p˜) is a profile of agent strategies s
where each si maps a value to a bid that is a best response regardless of what other agents are doing.
The characterization of DSE follows from the BNE characterization: (a) the allocation x(vi,v−i) is
monotone non-decreasing in vi and (b) the payment p(vi,v−i) = vi · x(vi,v−i)−
∫ vi
0 x(t,v−i)dt. A
mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) if it induces a DSE where each agents
strategy is reporting her value truthfully. A mechanism is ex-post individual rational (ex-post IR)
if the allocation is non-negative for all value profile.
Optimal auctions with budgets Laffont and Robert (1996) and Maskin (2000) for the revenue
and welfare objectives, respectively, characterize the Bayesian optimal mechanisms for agents with
public budgets. With the following regularity assumptions on the distribution, defined distinctly
for revenue and welfare, the optimal mechanism has a nice form.
Definition 2.1. A single-dimensional public budget agent is public-budget regular for welfare if
her cumulative distribution function F (·) is concave; she is public-budget regular for revenue if
additionally v − 1−F (v)
f(v) is non-decreasing.
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Figure 1: Depicted are the interim allocation rules of the welfare-optimal and revenue-optimal
mechanisms for two agents with uniform values on [0, 1]. In each figure the highest-bid-wins allo-
cation rule is depicted with a dashed line.
The results of Laffont and Robert and Maskin can be reinterpreted, a` la Alaei et al. (2013), as
solving a single-agent interim optimization problem that is given by an interim constraint x⋆(·). An
interim allocation is interim feasible under the interim constraint x⋆(·) if for all values v ∈ [0, h],
the probability of allocating item to an agent with value greater than v with allocation rule x(·)
is at most that with allocation rule x⋆, i.e.
∫ h
v
x(t) dF (t) ≤
∫ h
v
x⋆(t) dF (t). In many cases solution
to these interim optimization problems will take the form of the original constraint with ironed
interval and reserve. Ironing on arbitrary interval [v†, v‡] corresponds to the distribution weighted
averaging as follow, x(v) =
∫ v‡
v†
x⋆(t) dF (t) for all v ∈ [v†, v‡]. Reserve at value v† corresponds
to rejecting all value below v† as follows, x(v) = 0 for all v ∈ [0, v†]. An important allocation
constraint is that given by the highest-bid-wins allocation rule. The highest-bid-wins allocation
rule for n agents and with values from cumulative distribution function F is x⋆(v) = Fn−1(v), e.g.,
for two agents with uniform values it is x⋆(v) = v.
Theorem 2.1 (Laffont and Robert, 1996; Maskin, 2000; Alaei et al., 2013). For public-budget regu-
lar i.i.d. agents and interim allocation constraint x⋆(·), the welfare-optimal single-agent mechanism
allocates as by x⋆(·) except that values in [v†, h] are ironed for some v† and the revenue-optimal
single-agent mechanism additionally reserve prices values in [0, v‡] for some v‡; payments are given
deterministically by the payment identity.
For single-item environments, one possible implementation of Theorem 2.1 is the all-pay auction.
The all-pay auction has a unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium which is identical to outcome described
in Theorem 2.1 for the allocation constraint given by the highest-bid-wins allocation rule.
Definition 2.2 (all-pay auction). The all-pay auction is a mechanism (x˜, p˜) where x˜(·) allocates
item to the agent with highest bid with tie broken at random and p˜(·) charges each agent their bid,
i.e. p˜i(b) = bi.
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Theorem 2.2 (Maskin, 2000). For public-budget regular i.i.d. agents, the all-pay auction is welfare
optimal.
3 Welfare Approximation of the Clinching Auction
In this section, we study a prior-independent revelation mechanism called the clinching auction in
single-item environments. Dobzinski et al. (2008) gave the following formulation of the clinching
auction and characterized properties of its outcome. See Figure 3b.
Definition 3.1 (clinching auction). The clinching auction maintains an allocation and price-clock
starting from zero. The price-clock ascends continuously and the allocation and budget are adjusted
as follows.
1. Agents whose values are less than price-clock are removed and their allocation is frozen.
2. The demand of any remaining agent is the remaining budget divided by the price-clock.
3. Each remaining agent clinches (and adds to their current allocation) an amount that corre-
sponds to the largest fraction of their demand that can be satisfied when all other remaining
agents are first given as much of their demand as possible.
4. The budget and allocation are updated to reflect the amount clinched in the previous step.
Proposition 3.1 (Dobzinski et al., 2008). For public-budget agents, the clinching auction always
allocates all items, is ex-post IR, and is DSIC.
Lemma 3.2 (a special case of Dobzinski et al., 2008). In single-item environment, for public-budget
agents with budget B and value profile v, and let k be the largest integer such that
v(k) ≥ B · k where v(k) is the k-th highest value in value profile v.
Then, the agents with highest (k− 1) values win with same probability greater or equal to 1
k
and the
agent with the k-th highest value wins with the remaining probability.
We use the following approach to show that the clinching auction is an e-approximation for
public-budget regular agents. We relax the feasibility constraint to an ex ante constraint and show
that the optimal mechanism that sells to each agent with ex ante probability 1/n simply posts a
price (of exactly B assuming that the budget binds) for a chance to win the item (Lemma 3.3,
below). This simple form of mechanism is closely approximated by the clinching auction which
sells k lotteries of 1/k probability (full details given subsequently). A key property is that in this
clinching auction with lotteries, the budget does not bind with constant probability. The probability
that the budget does not bind in the clinching auction with lotteries allows a lower bound on the
allocation probability in the clinching auction which allows its welfare to be compared to the ex
ante relaxation.
Consider the welfare-optimal auction. Since agents are symmetric, each agent will win with ex
ante probability exactly 1
n
in the welfare-optimal auction where n is the number of agents. We
replace the feasibility constraint that ex post allocation cannot allocate more than one item (i.e.∑
i∈[n] x˜i(v) ≤ 1 for all v) with a
1
n
ex ante constraint that each agent cannot be allocated more
than 1
n
in expectation (i.e. Ev[x(v)] ≤ 1/n). Ex ante optimal mechanisms for agents with public
budgets were proposed and studied by Alaei et al. (2013).
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Figure 2: The allocation rules of the ex ante relaxation (dashed), an 1/e-fraction of the ex ante
relaxation (dotted), and the clinching auction with lotteries (solid) are depicted. The clinching
auction with lotteries pointwise exceeds an 1/e-fraction of the ex ante relaxation.
Lemma 3.3 (Alaei et al., 2013). For public-budget regular i.i.d. agents with budget B, the ex ante
welfare-optimal mechanism is either:
i. Budget binds: Post the price B for allocation probability B
v†
≤ 1 with v† set to satisfy 1
n
=
B
v†
(1− F (v†)). Values v ≥ v† select the lottery.
ii. Allocation probability binds: Post price v† = F−1(1− 1
n
) for allocation probability one.
We build the connection between the clinching auction and the ex ante optimal mechanism by
considering the an additional auction: the clinching auction with lotteries Clinchk which allocates k
lotteries with winning probability 1/k per lottery, using the clinching auction framework under the
same public budget. Lemma 3.4 below shows that by selecting an appropriate k, the probability
that an agent with value v† wins in the clinching auction with lotteries Clinchk is at least an
e fraction of the probability that the agent (with value v†) wins in the ex ante relaxation. See
Figure 2.
Lemma 3.4. For public budget i.i.d. agents, at value v† defined in Lemma 3.3, there exists
k ∈ [n], such that the interim allocation of the clinching auction with lotteries xClinchk(v
†) is
an e-approximation of the interim allocation of the ex ante optimal mechanism xPP(v
†), i.e.,
xClinchk(v
†) ≥ 1/e · xPP(v
†).
Proof. Denote the notation v(j:m) as the j-th order statistic among m i.i.d. random variables from
distribution F .
We denote the posted pricing in Lemma 3.3 as PP. Let k0 = 1/xPP(h) where xPP(h) is the
interim allocation at the highest value h. By the construction of PP, F (v†) = 1− k0
n
and v† ≤ B ·k0
(equality holds when the budget binds in PP). Let k = ⌈k0⌉ be the smallest integer which is
greater or equal to k0. Consider the clinching auction Clinchk which allocates k lotteries with
winning probability 1/k per lottery, using the clinching auction framework under public budget B.
First, fix an arbitrary agent and fix her value to be v†, we consider the following event E : in
Clinchk, this agent with value v
† is one of the highest k valued agents and the budget does not
bind. Recall that when the budget does not bind, the highest k agents in Clinchk each receive
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lotteries (with allocation probability 1/k) and pay the value of the (k+1)-st highest agent divided
by k (i.e. v(k+1:n)/k). The budget bids in Clinchk if and only if v(k+1:n)/k ≤ B and we can lower
bound the lower bound the probability of the event E as follows,
Pr[E ] = Pr
[
(v(k:n−1)/k ≤ B) ∧ (v(k:n−1) ≤ v
†)
]
= Pr
[
(v(k:n−1)/k ≤ v
†/k0) ∧ (v(k:n−1) ≤ v
†)
]
= Pr
[
v(k:n−1) ≤ v
†
]
=
k−1∑
i=0
(
n−1
i
) (
k0
n
)i (
n−k0
n
)n−1−i
.
Above, the third line is derived from the second line using the definition of k ≥ k0. Denote by x
E
and xE¯ the allocation rule x conditioned on the events E and E¯ , respectively. The interim allocation
for Clinchk at value v
† can be lower bounded as follows.
xClinchk(v
†) = xEClinchk(v
†) ·Pr[E ] + xE¯Clinchk(v
†) ·Pr
[
E¯
]
≥ xEClinchk(v
†) ·Pr[E ]
= k0
k
· xPP(h) ·Pr[E ]
≥ 1
e
· xPP(h).
The final inequality follows because the term k0
k
·Pr[E ] achieves the minimum at 1/e when k0 = k = 1
and n goes to infinity.
We now prove our main theorem about the approximation ratio for the clinching auction.
Theorem 3.5. For public-budget regular i.i.d. agents, the clinching auction is an e-approximation
to the welfare-optimal mechanism.
Proof. By Lemma 3.3 the interim allocation rule of the ex ante optimal mechanism is a step function
that steps at value v†. By Lemma 3.4, at value v†, the allocation rule of the clinching auction with
lotteries is an e-approximation to that of the ex ante optimal mechanism. The allocation rule of the
clinching auction with lotteries is monotone, so its allocation rule is an e-approximation to that of
the ex ante optimal mechanism at every value. Consequently, the expected welfare of the clinching
auction with lotteries is at least an e-approximation to that of the ex ante relaxation. See Figure 2.
Finally, Lemma 3.2 implies that for every ex post value profile, the welfare of the clinching
auction is at least that of the clinching auction with lotteries.
For public-budget regular i.i.d. agents, the all-pay auction is optimal while the clinching auction
is not, since the budget binds for more value profiles in the clinching auction than in the all-pay
auction. Based on this, we give a 1.03 lower bound of the approximation ratio for the clinching
auction and leave the actual approximation ratio as an open problem.
Lemma 3.6. There exists the instance of public-budget regular agents where the clinching auction
is a 1.03-approximation of the welfare-optimal mechanism.
11
0 v† v‡ h
v1
L M H
L
M
H
0
v†
v‡
h
v2
1
0 1/2 1
0
1
2 +
v†v‡
2v2
2
1
2 −
v†v‡
2v2
1
(a) The middle-ironed clinching auction
0 B h
v10
B
h
v2
1
0
1
2
+ B
2
2v22
1
2
− B
2
2v21
(b) The clinching auction
Figure 3: The comparison of the allocation rule x1(v1, v2) for the middle-ironed clinching auction
and the clinching auction. In the middle-ironed clinching auction, for the values in interval M can
be thought as “ironed”, i.e. an agent receives the same outcome for any value v ∈M.
Proof. Consider a simple setting: there are 2 public-budget regular agents with value drawn uni-
formly from [0, h] and the budget B = 1.
By Theorem 2.2, the all-pay auction is welfare-optimal for public-budget regular agents. The
interim allocation rule of it is x(v) = v
h
if v ≤ 2 and x(v) = h+22h otherwise. The expected welfare
of all-pay auction is (3h3 + 6h2 − 12h + 8)/6h2.
The interim allocation rule of the clinching auction is x(v) = v
h
if v ≤ 1 and x(v) = h+22h −
1
2v2
otherwise. The expected welfare of the clinching auction is (3h3 + 6h2 − 3h− 6h ln h− 2)/6h2.
By setting h = 4.04, it optimizes the ratio as 1.03.
4 Bayesian Optimal DSIC Mechanism
In Theorem 2.2, the all-pay auction is welfare-optimal under public-budget regular distribution.
Hence, applying the revelation principle to the all-pay auction, it produces a Bayesian optimal
revelation mechanism. This mechanism is BIC but not DSIC. In this section, we characterize the
optimal DSIC mechanism for two agents with uniformly distributed values. We obtain a lower
bound on its approximation ratio with the BIC optimal mechanism.
We first introduce the middle-ironed clinching auction (for two agents).
Definition 4.1. The two-agent middle-ironed clinching auction is parameterized by v† ≤ B and
v‡ = 2B − v† and its outcome is highest-bid-wins on values less that v†, a fair lottery on values in
[v†, v‡], and the clinching auction on values exceeding v‡; a precise formulation for two-agents is
given in Figure 3a and a general formulation is given in Appendix A.
For two-agents case, the middle-ironed clinching auction allocates the item efficiently except
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for value profiles in MM (both agents with values in M) or HH (both agents with values in H).
For the value profile in MM, it randomly allocates the item to one of the agent with probability
1
2 with payment
v†
2 . For the value profile in HH, it allocates the item such that the budget binds
for the agent with higher value and the allocation rule depends on the lower value only. Figure 3b
depicts the allocation rule of the clinching auction for comparison. The middle-ironed clinching
auction can be implemented with an ascending price via a generalization of the clinching auction
that allows for price jumps which we develop in Appendix A (this generalization is non-trivial).
We will show that by selecting the proper thresholds v† and v‡, the middle-ironed clinching auc-
tion is the Bayesian optimal DSIC mechanism for two agents with uniformly distributed values. An
intuition behind the optimality of the middle-ironed clinching auction is as follows: Dobzinski et al.
(2008) show that for two public budget agents, the clinching auction is the only Pareto optimal
(i.e. there is no outcome which is weakly better for all agents and strictly better for one agent) and
DSIC auction. Moreover, after the price increases past the point where the budget binds, a differ-
ential equation governs the allocation of any DSIC mechanism. Our goal is to optimize expected
welfare rather than satisfy Pareto optimality. Sacrificing welfare for lower-valued agents by ironing
can delay the budget from binding and enable greater welfare from higher-valued agents. From our
proof of optimality, it is sufficient to only iron one region in the middle of value space.
Theorem 4.1. For two public-budget agents with budget B and value uniformly drawn from [0, h],
Bayesian optimal DSIC mechanism is the middle-ironed clinching auction with some thresholds v†
and v‡.
The approach of the proof is to write down our problem as a linear program (primal), assume
the middle-ironed clinching auction to be the solution, and then construct the dual program with
a dual solution which witnesses the optimality of the primal solution by complementary slackness.
This approach is reminiscent of that of Pai and Vohra (2014) and Devanur and Weinberg (2017);
however, our multi-agent DSIC constrained program presents novel challenges and for this reason
we only solve the problem of two agents and uniform distributions.
We first solve a discrete version of the problem. Then, we solve the continuous version as
the limit from the discrete version. Consider the value distribution with finite value space [h] =
{1, 2, . . . , h} with equal probability each. We begin by writing down the optimization program for
welfare maximization among all possible DSIC mechanism.
sup
(x,p)
∑
v1,v2∈[h]
(v1 · x1(v1, v2) + v2 · x2(v1, v2)) ·
1
h
· 1
h
s.t.
(x,p) are DSIC, ex-post IR, and feasible
(x,p) is budget balanced
By the characterization of dominant strategy equilibrium, we simplify this optimization program
into a linear program as follows,
max
(x,p)≥0
∑
v1,v2∈[h]
v1 · x(v1, v2)
s.t.
h · x(h, v2)−
∑h
t=1 x(t, v2) ≤ B for all v2 ∈ [h] [Budget Constraint]
x(v1, v2) + x(v2, v1) ≤ 1 for all v1, v2 ∈ [h] [Feasibility Constraint]
x(v1, v2) ≤ x(v1 + 1, v2) for all v1 ∈ [h− 1], v2 ∈ [h] [Monotonicity Constraint]
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where we assume x1(a, b) = x2(b, a) = x(a, b) for all a, b ∈ [h] since it is an agent-symmetric linear
program. 6
Additionally, we relax the monotonicity constraint by replacing it with x(v1, v2) ≤ x(h, v2)
which is common for Bayesian mechanism design with public budget agents.
x(v1, v2) ≤ x(h, v2) for all v1 ∈ [h− 1], v2 ∈ [h] [Relaxed Monotonicity Constraint]
Then we write down the corresponding dual program. Let {Λ(v2)}v2∈[h] denote the dual
variables for budget constraints; {β(v1, v2)}v1,v2∈[h] denote the dual variables for feasibility con-
straints (for simplicity, we use both β(v1, v2) and β(v2, v1) to denote the same dual variable); and
{µ(v1, v2)}v1∈[h−1],v2∈[h] denote the dual variables for monotonicity constraints. The dual program
is,
min
(Λ,β,µ)≥0
∑
v2∈[h]
B · Λ(v2) +
1
2
∑
v1,v2∈[h]
β(v1, v2)
s.t.
−Λ(v2) + β(v1, v2) + µ(v1, v2) ≥ v1 for all v1 ∈ [h− 1], v2 ∈ [h] [x(v1, v2)]
(h− 1)Λ(v2) + β(h, v2)−
∑h−1
t=1 µ(t, v2) ≥ h for all v2 ∈ [h] [x(h, v2)]
We give a short overview of the plan to solve the program. For each possible thresholds v†, v‡
chosen in the middle-ironed clinching auction, we first construct a solution in dual which satisfies
the complementary slackness with this middle-ironed clinching auction as a solution in primal.
These induced dual solutions may be infeasible. Next, we will show that there exists a pair of
thresholds v†, v‡ which induces a feasible dual solution. This feasible dual solution witnesses the
optimality of the middle-ironed clinching auction.
We will partition the dual variables into following five areas (L∗, MM, HH, MH and HM)
as in Figure 4; and construct the dual solution for them separately. We denote λ as the discrete
derivative of the dual variable Λ, i.e. λ(v) = Λ(v)− Λ(v + 1).
Λ in L: Since the budget constraints do not bind, by complementary slackness,
Λ(v) = 0 for all v ∈ L.
β,µ in L∗: Let (v, v′) be a value profile in area L∗ such that v ≥ v′. By complementary slackness
on x(v, v′), β(v, v′) + µ(v, v′)−Λ(v′) = v if v < h; β(v, v′)−
∑h−1
t=1 µ(t, v
′) + (h− 1)Λ(v′) = v
otherwise (i.e. v = h). We let
β(v, v′) = v and µ(v, v′) = 0.7
Since the relaxed monotonicity constraint does not bind at x(v′, v), i.e. x(v′, v) < x(h, v), the
corresponding dual variable is
µ(v′, v) = 0.
6 Note the program in turns of x(a, b) is asymmetric.
7An intuition here is: µ are the dual variables for the relaxed monotonicity constraint and can be thought as
indicators of ironing. Though the monotonicity constraint binds, this is not because of ironing but binding allocation
(i.e. x(·) ≤ 1). Therefore, we set µ as zero.
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Figure 4: We partition the dual variables into L∗ (at least one agent with value in L), HH (both
agents with values in H), MM (both agents with values in M), MH and HM (one agent with
value in M and the other with value in H) five areas.
β,µ in HH: Let (v, v′) be a value profile in areaHH such that v ≥ v′. Since both agents win with
non-zero probability, by complementary slackness on x(v, v′) and x(v′, v), the corresponding
dual constraints bind. Since the relaxed monotonicity constraint does not bind at x(v′, v),
the monotonicity dual variable is
µ(v′, v) = 0.
The binding dual constraint of x(v′, v) is β(v′, v) − Λ(v) + µ(v′, v) = v′. Hence,
β(v, v′) = β(v′, v) = v′ + Λ(v).8
The binding dual constraint of x(v, v′) is β(v, v′) − Λ(v′) + µ(v, v′) = v. Note the relaxed
monotonicity constraint is tight for (v, v′). Hence,
µ(v, v′) = v − v′ + Λ(v′)− Λ(v).
Here we write β,µ as terms of Λ. In the next paragraph, we will solve for Λ.
Λ in H: Let v ∈ H. Consider the binding dual constraint of x(h, v), (h − 1)Λ(v) + β(h, v) −∑h−1
t=1 µ(t, v) = h. Notice that by complementary slackness, µ(t, v) = 0 for all t ≤ v. Plugging
β and µ as terms of Λ into the these dual constraints of x(h, v), we can solve for Λ as
λ(v) =
h− v
v
for all v ∈ H and Λ(h) = 0.9
8Recall that β(v, v′) and β(v′, v) denote the same dual variable.
9Recall that λ is the discrete derivative of dual variables Λ, so Λ(v) =
∑
h−1
t=v
λ(v).
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β,µ in MM and Λ in M: Let (v, v′) be a value profile in area MM such that v ≥ v′. Since the
relaxed monotonicity constraints do not bind for either x(v, v′) or x(v′, v), the corresponding
dual variables are
µ(v, v′) = µ(v′, v) = 0.
The binding dual constraints of x(v, v′) implies β(v, v′) = v′ + Λ(v). On the other hand,
the binding dual constraints of x(v′, v) implies β(v′, v) = v + Λ(v′). Recall that β(v, v′) and
β(v′, v) denote the same variable, hence,
λ(v) = −1 for all v ∈M \ {v‡ − 1}, 10
β(v, v′) = Λ(v‡) + λ(v‡ − 1) + v + v′ − v‡.
β,µ in MH and HM: Let (v, v′) be a value profile in area HM such that v > v′. With the
similar argument for area HH,
µ(v′, v) = 0 and µ(v, v′) = v − v′ + Λ(v′)− Λ(v),
β(v, v′) = v′ + Λ(v) if v < h.
Plugging µ as terms of Λ into the binding dual constraint of x(h, v′),
β(h, v′) = (h− 1)(v‡ − v′) + 1 + (v‡ − 1)λ(v‡ − 1).
With the analysis above, we construct the following dual solution which satisfies complementary
slackness with the middle-ironed clinching auction as a solution in primal,
Λ(v2) =


0 if v2 < v
†∑h−1
k=v‡
h−k
k
+ v2 − v
‡ + 1 + λ(v‡ − 1) if v† ≤ v2 < v
‡∑h−1
k=v2
h−k
k
if v2 ≥ v
‡
β(v1, v2) =


v1 if v1 ≥ v2, v2 < v
†∑h−1
k=v‡
h−k
k
+ v1 + v2 − v
‡ + 1 + λ(v‡ − 1) if v1 ≥ v2, v
† ≤ v2 < v
‡, v1 < v
‡∑h−1
k=v1
h−k
k
+ v2 if v1 ≥ v2, v
† ≤ v2 < v
‡, v‡ ≤ v1 ≤ h− 1
(h− 1)(v‡ − v2) + 1 + (v
‡ − 1)λ(v‡ − 1) if v1 ≥ v2, v
† ≤ v2 < v
‡, v1 = h∑h−1
k=v1
h−k
k
+ v2 if v1 ≥ v2, v
‡ ≤ v2
µ(v1, v2) =


0 if v2 < v
†
0 if v† ≤ v2 < v
‡, v1 < v
‡
v1 − v
‡ +
∑v1−1
k=v‡
h−k
k
+ 1 + λ(v‡ − 1) if v† ≤ v2 < v
‡, v1 ≥ v
‡
0 if v2 ≥ v
‡, v1 ≤ v2
v1 − v2 +
∑v1−1
k=v2
h−k
k
if v2 ≥ v
‡, v1 > v2
(1)
Lemma 4.2. For the middle-ironed clinching auction with arbitrary thresholds v† and v‡, the dual
solution (1) satisfies the complementary slackness.
10 Complementary slackness does not pin down λ(v‡ − 1). We leave it as a variable and identify it later when we
choose the thresholds v†, v‡ to ensure that the dual solution is feasible.
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Proof. The complementary slackness is directly implied by the construction above.
Though the this dual solution satisfies the complementary slackness, it may be infeasible. There-
fore, we argue that there exists some thresholds v†, v‡ and λ(v‡− 1) under which the dual solution
is feasible.
Lemma 4.3. There exists v†, v‡ and λ(v‡−1) such that the constructed dual solution (1) is feasible.
Proof. We define function Z(v) = 2v − 2B − 2−
∑h−1
k=v
h−k
k
to simplify the argument. Notice that
Λ(v) =
∑h−1
k=v
h−k
k
in the dual solution (1) if v ∈ H.
Due to complementary slackness, all dual constraints corresponding to some x(v, v′) > 0 bind,
so they are satisfied automatically. Hence, to ensure the constructed dual solution is feasible, there
remain four groups of constraints which need to be satisfied. For each group of constraints, there
is a “pivotal” constraint such that if it is satisfied, all constraints in that group is satisfied. We list
these four groups of constraints and “pivotal” constraint for each group below,
All dual constraints of x(v, v′) where v ∈ L and v′ ∈M: The pivotal constraint is the dual
constraint of x(v† − 1, 1), which can be simplified as
λ(v‡ − 1) ≤ Z(v‡).
All dual constraints of x(v, v′) where v ∈ L and v′ ∈ H: The pivotal constraint is the dual
constraint of x(v† − 1, v‡), which can be simplified as
−1 ≤ Z(v‡).
All dual constraints of x(v, h) where v ∈M: The pivotal constraint is the dual constraint of
x(v‡ − 1, h), which can be simplified as
λ(v‡ − 1) ≤
h
v‡ − 1
− 1.
Λ,µ,β ≥ 0: The pivotal constraint is Λ(v†) ≥ 0, which can be simplified as
λ(v‡ − 1) ≥ Z(v‡)− 1.
We now show how to relate v†, v‡ and λ(v‡− 1) to satisfy the four inequalities identified above.
Notice that when v† = 1 and v‡ = 2B+1, the interval L becomes empty. In that case, the first
and second groups of constraints disappear. The combination of these four inequalities is equivalent
to
i. v‡ = 2B + 1 and Z(v‡) ≤ h
v‡−1
; or
ii. −1 ≤ Z(v‡) ≤ h
v‡−1
.
Without loss of generality, we assume that Condition (i) does not hold and then argue that
Condition (ii) holds in this case.
The construction of Z(·) implies the following two facts,
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(a) if Z(v) < −1, then Z(v + 1) < h
v
;
(b) if Z(v) > h
v−1 , then Z(v − 1) > −1.
If we think of interval (−1, h
v−1 ) as a “window”, these two facts say that if a point Z(v) is on the
left hand side of this window (i.e. Z(v) < −1) , then the next point Z(v + 1) cannot jump to the
right hand side of the window (i.e. it is either in the window or still on the left hand side of the
window) and vice versa. Notice that Z(B + 1) = −
∑h−1
k=B+1
h−k
k
≤ 0 < h
B
and our assumption
(i.e. Condition (i) does not hold) implies Z(2B + 1) > h2B > −1. Thus, there exists v
‡ such that
−1 ≤ Z(v‡) ≤ h
v‡−1
, i.e. Condition (ii) holds.
The construction of the dual solution which satisfies feasibility and complementary slackness
witnesses the optimality of the middle-ironed clinching auction. We offer the following discrete
version of Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.4. For two public-budget agents with value uniformly distributed from {1, . . . , h}, the
Bayesian optimal DSIC mechanism is the middle-ironed clinching auction for some thresholds v†
and v‡.
We now focus on continuous uniform distribution with value space [0, h]. Again, we write the
problem as an optimization program as follows,
max
(x,p)≥0
h∫
0
h∫
0
v1 · x(v1, v2)dv2dv1
s.t.
h · x(h, v2)−
∫ h
0 x(t, v2)dt ≤ B for all v2 ∈ [0, h] [Budget Constraint]
x(v1, v2) + x(v2, v1) ≤ 1 for all v1, v2 ∈ [0, h] [Feasibility Constraint]
x(v1, v2) ≤ x(h, v2) for all v1, v2 ∈ [0, h] [Relaxed Monotonicity Constraint]
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Discretize the value space [0, h] into {ǫ, 2ǫ, . . . ,mǫ} where mǫ = h with
density 1
m
each. Define Xǫ to be the class of all possible DSIC, ex-post IR, budget balanced
allocations such that each value v ∈ [(k − 1)ǫ, kǫ) must be ironed for all k = 1, . . . , h. By the
construction of Xǫ, the allocation function x
ǫ in Theorem 4.4 indeed solves maxx∈Xǫ
∫ h
0
∫ h
0 v1 ·
x(v1, v2)dv2dv1 after rescaling both value space and budget by
1
ǫ
.
Let X be the class of all possible DSIC, ex-post IR, budget balanced allocations. Notice that
Xǫ converges to X pointwise and that both are compact subsets of the L1 space defined by uniform
measure. The operator T (x) =
∫ h
0
∫ h
0 v1 · x(v1, v2)dv2dv1 is a bounded linear operator from the L1
space of allocation function to R. Therefore, T achieves its maximum on each set X ǫ and X .
The pointwise convergence ensures that
lim
ǫ→0
max
x∈X ǫ
∫ h
0
∫ h
0
v1 · x(v1, v2)dv2dv1 = max
x∈X
∫ h
0
∫ h
0
v1 · x(v1, v2)dv2dv1
Since T (x) is a bounded linear operator and {xǫ} has a pointwise limit,
lim
ǫ→0
xǫ ∈ {argmaxx∈X
∫ h
0
∫ h
0
v1 · x(v1, v2)dv2dv1}.
Thus, we see that Theorem 4.1 holds.
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Based on Theorem 4.1, we compare the performance between the DSIC mechanism and the
welfare-optimal BIC mechanism.
Lemma 4.5. There exists the instance of public-budget regular agents where the welfare-optimal
DSIC mechanism is a 1.013-approximation to the welfare-optimal BIC mechanism.
Proof. Consider two agents with values drawn uniformly from [0, h] where h ≥ 5.5 and the budget
B = 1. By Theorem 4.1, the welfare-optimal DSIC mechanism in this case is the middle-ironed
clinching auction with v† = 0 and v‡ = 2. The welfare-optimal BIC mechanism is the all-pay
auction (applying the revelation principle). By computing the welfare for both mechanisms under
this distribution, and setting h = 5.5, it optimizes the ratio as 1.013.
5 Revelation Gap
In the literature, prior-independent mechanisms have been shown to approximate the Bayesian
optimal mechanism for many objectives. Interestingly, except when the solution is trivial, none of
the approximation mechanisms in the literature are known to be optimal. The formal question of
optimal prior-independent mechanism design is the following:
β = min
M∈MECHS
max
F∈DISTS
Ev∼F [OPTF (v)]
Ev∼F [M(v)]
.
In this definition, Ev∼F [M(v)] is the equilibrium performance of mechanism M on distribution F
and OPTF is the optimal mechanism for given objective on distribution F . Importantly in this
definition, the family of mechanism MECHS may be restricted from all mechanisms and the family
of distribution DISTS may be restricted from all distributions.
As discussed in the introduction, the revelation principle is not without loss for prior-independent
mechanism design. Based on this idea, we introduce the concept of revelation gap.
Definition 5.1. The revelation gap is the ratio of the prior-independent approximation of incen-
tive compatible mechanisms to the prior-independent approximation of (generally non-revelation)
mechanisms.
In this section, we consider welfare maximization with public-budget regular agents. With the
results in the previous sections, we give both the upper bound and the lower bound of revelation
gap for this objective.
Theorem 5.1. For public-budget regular i.i.d. agents, the revelation gap for welfare maximization is
at most e. Specifically, this upper bound considers prior-independent DSIC, ex-post IR mechanisms.
Proof. This upper bound is given by considering the clinching auction which is a prior-independent
DSIC and ex-post IR mechanism. Theorem 3.5 says that the clinching auction is an e-approximation
to the welfare-optimal mechanism for public-budget regular agents. Thus, the revelation gap is at
most e.
For the lower bound, we use the result in Section 4 where we solve the welfare-optimal DSIC
mechanism for two agent with uniformly distributed values. Note that for two-agent environments,
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the DSIC ex-post IR constraints are equivalent to prior-independent BIC and IIR constraints.11
With more than two agents, this equivalence does not generally hold.
Lemma 5.2. For two i.i.d. agents, a mechanism is Bayesian incentive compatible and interim in-
dividual rational for all i.i.d. distributions if and only if it is dominant strategy incentive compatible
and ex-post individually rational.
Proof. The direction that DSIC implies BIC for all i.i.d. distribution is trivial by the definition.
To show the other direction, for arbitrary value v, consider the distribution which puts the whole
mass on v. These distributions break the interim constraints in BIC into the ex-post constraints
in DSIC for every value profiles. Hence, BIC for all i.i.d. distribution implies DSIC for two agents
setting.
Theorem 5.3. For public-budget regular i.i.d. agents, the revelation gap for welfare maximization
is at least 1.013.
Proof. This lower bound is given by considering the all-pay auction and the middle-ironed clinching
auction.
As the characterization in Section 2, the all-pay auction is a prior-independent mechanism.
Theorem 2.2 says that the all-pay auction is welfare-optimal for public budget regular agents.
Hence, the prior-independent approximation of the all-pay auction is 1.
Next, we show that the prior-independent approximation of Bayesian incentive compatible
mechanisms is at least 1.013. Theorem 4.1 says that the middle-ironed clinching auction is Bayesian
optimal DSIC mechanism for two agents with values drawn uniformly from [0, h]. Since for
two agents case, the DSIC property is equivalent to the BIC for all i.i.d. distribution property,
Lemma 4.5 suggests that the prior-independent approximation of incentive compatible mechanisms
is at least 1.013.
Thus, the revelation gap for welfare maximization is at least 1.013.
6 Welfare Approximation for Irregular Distribution
In this section, we analyze the welfare approximation of the all-pay auction and the clinching
auction for public budget agents without regularity assumption.
The main technique we use is the following lemma which relaxes the budget constraint to
another constraint which upper bounds the wining probability of the highest value, i.e. x(h) where
h is the highest value in the support of the distribution.
Lemma 6.1. Given any interim constraint x⋆ and budget B, let v† be the value where the bud-
get binds in x⋆ after ironing from v† to h, i.e. v† · z⋆(v†) −
∫ v†
0 x
⋆(t)dt = B where z⋆(v†) =
1
1−F (v†)
∫ h
v†
x⋆(t)dF (t), the averaging wining probability for value beyond v† in allocation x⋆. Any
interim feasible and budget balanced allocation x satisfies
x(h) ≤ 2z⋆(v†).
11Prior-independent BIC and IIR mechanisms are the mechanisms which are BIC and IIR for all i.i.d. distributions.
This property is stronger than BIC (for a single distribution) but generally weaker than DSIC.
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(a) B ≤ v† · z⋆(v†)
B
0 v† h
0
x(v†)
x(h)
1
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(b) B ≥ v† · (x(h)− x(v†))
Figure 5: Proofs by picture of the upper bound and lower bound on budget B.
Proof. Recall that v† is the value where the budget binds in x⋆ after ironing from v† to h. Thus,
B = v† · z⋆(v†)−
∫ v†
0
x⋆(t)dt ≤ v† · z⋆(v†).
On the other hand, suppose x is budget balance,
B ≥ h · x(h) −
∫ h
0
x(t)dt ≥ v† · (x(h)− x(v†))
Suppose x is interim feasible,
x(v†) ≤
1
1− F (v†)
∫ h
v†
x(t)dt ≤
1
1− F (v†)
∫ h
v†
x⋆(t)dt = z⋆(v†).
Combine the inequalities above,
x(h) ≤ x(v†) + z⋆(v†) ≤ 2z⋆(v†).
The All-pay Auction
First, we discuss the performance of all-pay auction for the irregular distribution. Pai and Vohra
(2014) show that the welfare-optimal interim allocation is both ironing top interval and perhaps
ironing some other intervals in the middle. It turns out that even though the all-pay auction only
irons the top interval, its welfare only suffers a modest loss.
Theorem 6.2. For public-budget i.i.d. agents, the all-pay auction is a 2-approximation to the
welfare-optimal mechanism.
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Proof. Applying Lemma 6.1, we relax the budget constraint to the constraint that x(h) ≤ 2z⋆(v†).
Denote x0 as the welfare-optimal interim feasible and budget balanced allocation and x as
the welfare-optimal interim feasible allocation under the relaxed constraint, then welfare[x0] ≤
welfare[x].
Since x maximizes the welfare under interim feasibility constraint x⋆, it allocates as by x⋆
except that values in [v‡, h] are ironed. The threshold v‡ is selected such that x(h) = 2z⋆(v†). By
definitions of v† and v‡, we know v† ≤ v‡. Consider x for values below and beyond v† separately.
For value below v†, the expected welfare
∫ v†
0 v · x(v)dF (v) =
∫ v†
0 v · x
⋆(v)dF (v). For value beyond
v†, the expected welfare
∫ h
v†
v · x(v)dF (v) ≤
∫ h
v†
v · 2z⋆(v†)dF (v).
Notice that v† coincides with the threshold in the all-pay auction, and the all-pay auction
allocates as by x⋆ except value beyond v† win with probability z⋆(v†). Thus, welfare[x] ≤ 2 ·
welfare[All-pay].
In fact, the 2-approximation bound is tight.
Lemma 6.3. There exists the instance where the welfare of the all-pay auction is half of welfare-
optimal mechanism.
Proof. Consider the following single-item instance with budget B = 1. There are N + 1 agents
with valuation distribution
v =


N − ǫ w.p. 1
N+1 ,
N w.p. N−1
N+1 ,
N3 w.p. 1
N+1 .
In the all-pay auction, the interim allocation rule irons values N and N3,
x(v) =
{
δ if v = N − ǫ,
1−δ
N
if v = N or N3,
where δ = ( 1(N+1) )
N+1 → 0.
where the expected welfare is roughly N + 1.
Notice that in the all-pay auction, the mechanism uses almost all budget to distinguish values
N − ǫ and N whose contribution to the expected welfare is almost the same. Therefore, consider
the auction which irons values N − ǫ and N , and moves some winning probability from value N3
to values N − ǫ,N as follows,
x(v) =
{
N−1
N(N+1) if v = N − ǫ or N,
2
N+1 if v = N
3.
where the expected welfare is roughly 2N + 1.
Let N → ∞ and ǫ → 0, the expected welfare from the all-pay auction is exactly half of the
expected welfare from the optimal auction.
The Clinching Auction
To analyze the welfare approximation of the clinching auction for irregular distributions, we follow
almost the same argument as for regular distributions. The only difference in the argument is
that the ex ante welfare-optimal mechanism may not be a simple posted price for a probabilistic
allocation. However, by Lemma 6.1, such a posted pricing is still a 2-approximation.
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Lemma 6.4. For public-budget i.i.d. agents, the posted pricing described in Lemma 3.3 is a 2-
approximation to the ex ante welfare-optimal mechanism.
Proof. Consider the interim constraint x⋆(v) = 1 if F (v) ≥ 1/n and x⋆(v) = 0 if F (v) < 1/n.
Applying the similar argument in Theorem 6.2 with Lemma 6.1, the lemma holds.
The following corollary is combines Lemma 6.4 with Theorem 3.5.
Corollary 6.5. For public-budget i.i.d. agents, the clinching auction is a 2e-approximation to the
welfare-optimal mechanism.
7 Welfare Approximation of Losers-pay-nothing Mechanisms
Both the all-pay and clinching auctions discussed previously allocate probabilistically and agents
make payments even when they lose. These mechanisms contrast with the first-price and second-
price auctions which have the property that losers pay nothing. In this section we will show that
losers-pay-nothing mechanisms do not give good approximations to the welfare-optimal mechanism.
Our approach is to prove three results. First, we show that when optimizing over losers-pay-
nothing mechanisms, it is without loss in the objective to consider only winner-pays-bid mecha-
nisms. Second, we show that for public-budget regular agents and a single-item the the welfare-
optimal winner-pays-bid mechanism is highest bid wins, i.e., it is the first-price auction. Third, we
show that there is a public-budget regular distribution where the welfare of the first-price auction is
a linear factor from the welfare of the optimal mechanism (which is the all-pay auction). Combining
these results we see that losers-pay-nothing mechanisms are not good approximation mechanisms.
The main difference between winner-pays-bid and all-pay mechanisms is that the budget binds
over a larger range of values for winner-pays-bid mechanisms. Consequently the allocation rule of
winner-pays-bid mechanisms is further from the efficient highest-value-wins allocation rule.
Winner-pays-bid versus Loser-pays-nothing Mechanisms
Mechanisms can map bids to probabilistic outcomes. Denote the random bits accessed by a mech-
anism by π. Our previously defined allocation and payment rules take expectation over this ran-
domization, i.e., x˜(b) = Eπ[x˜
π(b)] and p˜(b) = Eπ[p˜
π(b)] where both x˜π and p˜π are deterministic
functions. Specifically x˜π(b) ∈ {0, 1}n.
Definition 7.1. A loser-pays-nothing mechanism (x˜, p˜) satisfies p˜πi (b) = 0 if x˜
π
i (b) = 0 for all
agents i and random bits π.
Definition 7.2. A winner-pays-bid mechanism (x˜, p˜) satisfies p˜πi (b) = bi x˜
π
i (b) for all agents i and
random bits π.
Lemma 7.1. For public budget agents, a winner-pays-bid mechanism is optimal among all loser-
pays-nothing mechanisms.
Proof. Let (x,p) be the BNE allocation and payment rules of any loser-pays-nothing mechanism.
First, disregarding the budget constraints of the agents, there is a winner-pays-bid mechanisms
with the same BNE allocation and payment rules. This fact is a straightforward consequence of the
characterization of Bayes-Nash equilibrium, e.g., see Chawla and Hartline (2013). Second, as these
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two mechanisms have the same interim allocation rule, namely x; the payment-identity requires
that they have the same interim payment rule, namely p. Losers pay nothing in both mechanisms.
Thus, the expected payment of an agent i with a value vi conditioned on winning is the same
in the two mechanisms. In the winner pays bid mechanism the agent’s payment conditioned on
winning is deterministically equal to its conditional expectation. In the original loser-pays-nothing
mechanism the maximum payment in the support of the conditional payment distribution is no
lower than its expectation. Consequently, the disregarded budget constraints are satisfied by the
constructed winner-pays-bid mechanism and it obtains the same objective value.
Optimal Winner-pays-bid Mechanisms
Recall that for i.i.d. public-budget regular agents, the optimal mechanism allocates efficiently except
that an interval of highest-valued agents are ironed and payments are deterministic functions of
values. Specifically, in a single-item environment, the all-pay auction is optimal. We will show
below that, restricting the mechanism to be winner-pays-bid, the optimal mechanism has the same
form. It allocates efficiently except that an interval of highest values agents are ironed. Specifically,
in a single-item environment, the first-price auction is optimal. Notice that the first-price auction
is the winner-pays-bid highest-bid-wins mechanism.
Theorem 7.2. For i.i.d. public-budget regular agents, the welfare-optimal winner-pays-bid mecha-
nism is the highest-bid-wins mechanism, i.e. the first-price auction.
The formal proof of Theorem 7.2 is given in Appendix B. It can be proved using standard
methods in Bayesian mechanism design with budgets, e.g., Laffont and Robert (1996) and Maskin
(2000). We give simpler approach that is based on the Alaei et al. (2013) reduction to ex ante
pricing. Note that the approach of Alaei et al. (2013) cannot be directly applied as public-budget
agents do not have linear utility and the optimal revenues for non-linear agents do not satisfy an
important linearity property. We write the problem as a optimization program, use the Lagrangian
relaxation to move the budget constraint into the objective, and then observe that the Lagrangian
relaxed objective does satisfy the linearity property of Alaei et al. (2013).
Lowerbound for Winner-pays-bid Mechanisms
With Theorem 7.2, we compare the performance of the welfare-optimal winner-pays-bid mechanism
and the welfare-optimal mechanism. For i.i.d. public-budget regular agents and a single-item, this
comparison is between the first-price auction and the all-pay auction.
Lemma 7.3. For n i.i.d.public-budget agents, the first-price auction is at best an
(
1
4n− o(n)
)
-
approximation to the all-pay auction.
Proof. Consider n agents with budget B = (1 − 1
e
) 1
n
and value distributed from the following
distribution F with density function
f(v) =
{
n− 1 if v ∈ [0, 1
n
]
1
n−1 if v ∈ (
1
n
, 1].
By Theorem 7.2, the welfare-optimal winner-pays-bid mechanism is the first-price auction where
each agent bids B if her value is beyond some v† to satisfy
pfirst-price(v
†)
xfirst-price(v†)
= B. In this setting, as n
goes to infinity, v† goes to B, and the expected welfare goes to
(
(1− 12e)(1 −
1
e
) + 12
)
1
n
+ o( 1
n
).
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The welfare-optimal mechanism is the all-pay auction where each agent bids B if her value is
beyond some v‡ such that pall-pay(v
‡) = B. In this setting, as n goes infinity, v‡ goes to 1
n
, and the
expected welfare goes to (1− 1
e
)12 + o(1).
Thus, as n goes to infinity, the expected welfare of the first-price auction is an 14n-approximation
to the all-pay auction.
It is easy to see that this linear approximation is tight up to constant factors. Specifically,
the n-agent lottery, which allocates the item to a random agent without payments, is trivially an
n-approximation.
8 Revenue Approximation of the All-pay Auction
In this section, we analyze the approximation ratio of the all-pay auction for public-budget regular
agents with the revenue-optimal mechanism. In the preliminaries, Theorem 2.1 shows that the
revenue-optimal mechanism irons the top and sets a reserve with the combined effect that the bud-
get binds for the highest value. From the equivalence of the all-pay auction (Theorem 2.2) and the
welfare-optimal auction (Theorem 2.1), the all-pay auction irons top values to decrease the payment
of highest value to meet the budget. Even though the value intervals ironed at top are different
between all-pay auction and optimal auction (specifically the all-pay auction irons less than the
optimal auction), the all-pay auction is still a good approximation to the revenue-optimal mecha-
nism. Our analysis follows Kirkegaard’s 2006 proof of the main theorem from Bulow and Klemperer
(1996). These results show that, without budgets, the revenue of the second-price auction approx-
imates the optimal revenue for i.i.d. and regular agents. The revenue-optimal mechanism allocates
the item to the highest agent whose value exceeds a specific reserve price while the second-price
auction allocates the item to the highest agent with no reserve. As is crucial for Kirkegaard’s proof,
the second-price auction can be thought as the revenue-optimal mechanism under the constraint
that the item must be allocated.
Theorem 8.1 (Bulow and Klemperer 1996). For n ≥ 2 regular i.i.d. agents with linear utilities,
the expected revenue of the second-price auction is an n
n−1-approximation to the revenue-optimal
mechanism.
For agents with public budget, the all-pay auction plays the similar role as the second-price
auction.
Theorem 8.2. For n ≥ 2 public-budget regular i.i.d. agents, the all-pay auction is an n
n−1-
approximation to the revenue-optimal mechanism.
Proof. First, we introduce a common approach of the revenue analysis in Bayesian mechanism
design. Myerson (1981) defined the virtual valuation for sum of payments as φ(v) = v− 1−F (v)
f(v) and
proved that the expected payment E[p(v)] of an agent in any BNE is equal to her expected virtual
surplus E[φ(v)x(v)]. We use this concept in the following argument.
Denote value v† as the threshold where the all-pay auction starts to iron.
Consider the optimal mechanism which is (i) budget balanced, (ii) irons the interval [v†, h], and
(iii) always sells the item for n public-budget regular i.i.d. agents.
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We claim that the optimal auction under these three requirements is the all-pay auction by
analyzing the virtual surplus.12 For public-budget regular agents, their virtual value is monotone
non-decreasing. Consider the virtual surplus from values v below and above v† separately. For
values v ≥ v†, requirement (ii) upper bounds the allocation x(v) to be at most as the all-pay auction
(otherwise, the budget constraint will be violated). For values v ≤ v†, the all-pay auction always
allocates the item to the agent with highest virtual value. Thus, the all-pay auction maximizes the
virtual surplus under these three requirements.
On the other hand, consider the following auction LB:
1. run the n-agent revenue-optimal budget-balanced auction on the first n− 1 agents and a fake
agent;
2. if the auction does not sell the item to anyone within the first n − 1 agents (i.e. the auction
does not sell the item or sells it to the fake agent), give the item to the n-th agent for free.
LB is budget balanced and always sells the item for n public-budget regular i.i.d. agents. Notice
that the revenue-optimal auction for public budget n agents irons more than the all-pay at the top.
Hence, LB satisfies the three requirements. The expected revenue from it is n−1
n
fraction of the
expected revenue from the revenue-optimal auction for n public-budget regular i.i.d. agents.
We conclude that the expected revenue of the all-pay auction is at least the expected revenue
of LB which is n−1
n
fraction of the revenue-optimal mechanism. Thus, the all-pay auction is an n
n−1
approximation to the revenue-optimal mechanism.
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A Clinching Auction with Price Jumps
In this section, we introduce the clinching auction with price jumps. In the standard clinching
auction, with a continuous increasing price-clock, excess demand decreases continuously to the
point where supply equals demand and the market clears. With a price jump, which leads to a strict
drop of demands, the standard clinching auction may leave some supply unallocated. Therefore,
to clear the market, the clinching auction with price jumps will need to reallocate some amount
of units at the pre-jump price after a price jump. We first focus on the clinching auction with
price jumps for agents with identical budgets. The results can be extended to agents with distinct
budgets, which we will discuss at the end of this section.
To formally describe this reallocation, suppose the price-clock jumps from v† to v‡. Consider
the state C = (s, S†, B) at price v† after the clinching step (i.e. Step 3 in Definition 3.1) where s
is the current supply remaining, S† is the agents with values at least v† (let k† = |S†|), and B is
the current budget of the active agents. 13 When the price jumps to v‡, active agents with values
below v‡ (“low-valued” agents) will quit, while active agents with values at least v‡ (“high-valued”
agents) will stay in the auction. Denote by S‡ the set of high-valued agents and by k = |S‡| the
number of high-valued agents. With pre-jump state C = (s, S†, B) and k agents remaining after the
jump, define hCk and l
C
k as the additional supply allocated at the low price to high- and low-valued
agents, respectively.
In the following discussion, we fix an arbitrary state C = (s, S†, B) with k† = |S†| active agents,
drop the superscript of hCk and l
C
k , and consider hk and lk constrained to the following polytope:
IC: ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , k†} hk = lk−1,
BB: ∀k ∈ {0, . . . , k†} hk, lk ≤ B/v
†,
NN: ∀k ∈ {0, . . . , k†} hk, lk ≥ 0,
MC: ∀k ∈ {0, . . . , k†} k hk + (k
† − k) lk +
k
v‡
(B − v† hk) ≥ s,
LS: ∀k ∈ {0, . . . , k†} k hk + (k
† − k) lk ≤ s.
(2)
The constraints above are, respectively, incentive compatibility (IC), budget balance (BB), non-
negative consumption (NN), market clearing (MC), and limited supply (LS). The IC constraint
requires that the amount of supply which an agent gets at price v† does not depend on whether the
agent stays or quits during the price jump. The left-hand side of the incentive compatibility (IC)
13In the model considered in this paper where initially the agents have identical budgets, the remaining budgets of
all active agents remain identical throughout the execution of the clinching auction.
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constraint is the additional allocation quantity at price v† if an agent stays during the price jump,
while the right hand side is the additional allocation quantity at price v† if she quits. Since the
two quantities are equal, active agents with values in [v†, v‡) prefer to quit after the clinching step
at price v† while agents with value at least v‡ prefer to stay in the auction. The market clearing
(MC) constraint states that the reallocated supply at the low price v† (the first two terms) plus
the quantity demanded by the high-valued agents at the high price v‡ (the third term) must be at
least the supply. The limited supply (LS) constraint states that the amount allocated at the low
price for any number k of high-valued agents must not exceed the supply.
Consider the problem of selecting a point in polytope (2) to optimize the expected welfare
under the value distribution F . First notice that, since the state C = (s, S†, B) is induced by the
clinching auction, the total demand at price v† under budget B exceeds the remaining supply s,
i.e., k†B/v† ≥ s; setting hk = lk = s/k
† for all k ∈ [k†] is feasible; and, thus, polytope (2) is not
empty. The expected welfare of the clinching auction is complicated to express; we instead consider
the objective of minimizing, within the constraints of polytope (2), the expected supply reallocated
to low-valued agents, i.e.,
∑k†
k=0 lkπ
k†−k(1−π)k where π = F (v
‡)−F (v†)
1−F (v†)
= Prv∼F
[
v < v‡ | v ≥ v†
]
is
the probability an agent has a low value. Based on this reallocation, we formally define a clinching
auction with price jumps and show that it clears the market, is ex-post IR, and is DSIC.
Definition A.1. The clinching auction with price jumps maintains an allocation and price-clock
starting from zero. Before and after each price jump point, the price-clock ascends continuously
and the allocation and the budget are adjusted as in the standard clinching auction. When the
price-clock jumps from v† to v‡ the following steps are taken:
1. run the standard clinching steps on price-clock v† and the current budgets and let the subse-
quent state be C = (s, S†, B) with k† = |S†|;
2. increase the price-clock to v‡ and let k‡ = |S‡| be the number of agents remaining in the
auction;
3. solve for {hk, lk}k∈[k†] to minimize the expected quantity reallocated to the low-valued agents
in the polytope (2);
4. allocate hk‡ units at price v
† to each of the k‡ agents that stay after the price jump, allocate
lk‡ units at price v
† to each of the k† − k‡ agents that quit during the price jump, and adjust
all the agents’ budgets for the amount and price allocated;
5. run the standard clinching step with price-clock v‡ and updated budgets.
Proposition A.1. The clinching auction with price jumps always clears the market.
Proof. If the price-clock increases continuously, the demand decreases continuously. When the
total demands meet the supply remaining, Dobzinski et al. (2008) show that the standard clinching
auction halts and the market clears. For the clinching auction with price jumps, when the price-
clock goes through a price jump, the market clearing constraints that define polytope (2) guarantee
that the total demands are at least the supply remaining. Thus, the clinching auction with price
jumps clears the market.
Proposition A.2. The clinching auction with price jumps satisfies ex-post IR, DSIC, and budget
balance.
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Proof. Dobzinski et al. (2008) show that the standard clinching auction is ex-post IR, DSIC, and
budget balanced. For the clinching auction with price jumps, when the price-clock goes through a
price jump from v† to v‡, the IC constraints that define polytope (2) guarantee that the agents with
values at most v‡ weakly prefer to quit at price v† and the agents with values above v‡ prefer to
stay at price v†. Meanwhile, the budget constraints and non-negative consumption constraints that
define polytope (2) guarantee that the agents are budget balanced and have non-negative utility
after the price jump.
For two i.i.d. agents with identical budgets, the clinching auction with price jumps induces the
same outcome as the middle-ironed clinching auction (Definition 4.1). For a general number of
agents, it is polynomial time solvable. We conjecture that, for i.i.d. distributions and identical
budgets, minimizing the expected quantity reallocated to low-valued agents, i.e., the objective
described previously, is equivalent to maximizing expected welfare. We leave to future studies the
question of whether there is a more succinct characterization of the expected welfare maximizing
solution and the generalization to agents with non-identical valuation distributions.
If agents have distinct budgets, the linear program can be generalized by replacing the variables,
which corresponded to the reallocation to high- and low-valued agents with a given number k = |S‡|
of high-valued agents, with variables that correspond to the reallocation to each agent i with a given
set S‡ of high-valued agents. With this modification to the variables and constraints of polytope (2),
the previous argument guarantees the new polytope is non-empty. Notice that there are O(n · 2n)
variables defining the new polytope. It is possible, however, to optimize expected allocation to the
low-valued agents subject to this polytope in polynomial time when there are a constant number
of distinct budgets; symmetries across agents with identical budgets allow the number of variables
in the program to be reduced to a polynomial number. We leave to future studies the problem of
identifying a polynomial time algorithm for optimally reallocating the supply during a price jump
when there are generally distinct budgets.
B Bayesian Optimal Mechanisms for Budgeted Agents
In this section we give a simple geometric approach for identifying Bayesian optimal mechanisms
for budgeted agents. This approach can be used to derive Theorem 2.1, which characterizes the
Bayesian optimal mechanisms for revenue and welfare. Recall, that the mechanisms characterized
by Theorem 2.1 have deterministic interim payments and are naturally implemented by all-pay
mechanisms. In this section, we use the approach to analyze winner-pays-bid mechanisms and
identify the Bayesian optimal mechanisms restricted this family, i.e., we prove Theorem 7.2.
The main result of this section is Lemma B.1 which describes the optimal single-agent mecha-
nism for any interim constraint and combines with the fact that in symmetric single-item environ-
ments, the optimal multi-agent mechanism is given by the interim constraint that corresponds to
the highest-bid-wins allocation rule. Theorem 7.2, restated below, follows.
Lemma B.1. For a public-budget regular agent and interim allocation constraint x⋆(·), the welfare-
optimal winner-pays-bid single-agent mechanism allocates as by x⋆(·) except that values in [v†, h] are
ironed for some v†; payments are given deterministically by the payment identity and the winner-
pays-bid framework.
Theorem 7.2. For i.i.d. public-budget regular agents, the welfare-optimal winner-pays-bid mecha-
nism is the highest-bid-wins mechanism, i.e. the first-price auction.
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While Lemma B.1 can be proven using the traditional analysis of agents with budgets, e.g.,
Laffont and Robert (1996); we will give a proof that reduces interim optimization to ex ante op-
timization. For context, Bulow and Roberts (1989) reduce interim revenue maximization to ex
ante revenue maximization for single-dimensional linear agents (i.e. without budgets). Alaei et al.
(2013) generalized this approach to linear objectives (which do not require single-dimensional linear
agents). A challenge that our proof addresses is that public budget agents do not have linear utility
functions and, therefore, welfare maximization is not a linear objective.
Interim Optimization for Linear Objectives
We first introduce the interim optimal payoff, quantile space, and payoff curves; payoff curves are a
straightforward generalization of revenue curves to non-revenue objectives, cf. Alaei et al. (2013).
Definition B.1. For any general objective, the interim optimal payoff, given interim allocation
constraint x⋆, is the payoff of the single-agent mechanism (x, p) that satisfies the interim constraint∫ h
v
x(v) dF (v) ≤
∫ h
v
x⋆(v) dF (v) with the highest objective value; denote this optimal payoff by
Payoff [x⋆]. The objective is linear if the functional Payoff [·] is linear, i.e., if for any allocations
x = x† + x‡ then Payoff [x] = Payoff [x†] +Payoff [x‡].
Definition B.2. The quantile q of a single-dimensional agent with value v drawn from distribution
F is the measure with respect to F of stronger values, i.e., q = 1−F (v); the inverse demand curve
maps an agent’s quantile to her value, i.e., v(q) = F−1(1− q).
Definition B.3. For given ex ante allocation probability q, the single-agent ex ante pricing problem
is to find the optimal mechanism with ex ante allocation probability exactly q. The optimal ex ante
payoff, as a function of q, is denoted by the payoff curve Φ¯(q).
The ex ante pricing problem (Definition B.3) can be solved via the following geometric approach.
Definition B.4. For any q, denote the price-posting payoff curve, from posting price v(q), by Φ(q)
(with ties broken in favor of higher payoff).
If the price-posting payoff curve is differentiable and concave, the marginal price-posting payoff,
a.k.a., the derivative Φ′(q), is well defined and monotone non-increasing. Its pointwise optimization
leads to an optimal incentive compatible mechanism, cf. Myerson (1981). Specifically, the ex ante
pricing problem is solved by posted pricing and Φ¯ = Φ. Otherwise, analogous to the ironing method
of Myerson (1981), the ex ante pricing problem is solved by ironing the price-posting revenue curve.
Lemma B.2 (Alaei et al., 2013). Given any linear payoff objective Payoff [·], the payoff curve Φ¯,
which gives the optimal ex ante pricing as a function of quantile, is given by the concave hull of the
price-posting payoff curve Φ.
For linear objectives, the interim optimization problem (Definition B.1) is solved by reduction
to the ex ante optimization problem (Definition B.3).
Lemma B.3 (Alaei et al., 2013). Given any linear payoff objective Payoff [·], for any monotone
allocation x⋆(·) and an agent with any price-posting payoff curve Φ(q), the expected payoff of agent
is upper-bounded her expected marginal payoff of the same allocation rule, i.e.,
Payoff [x⋆] ≤ E
[
Φ¯′(q) · x⋆(v(q))
]
.
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Furthermore, this inequality holds with equality if the allocation rule x⋆ is constant all intervals of
values v(q) where Φ¯(q) > Φ(q).
This framework allows optimal mechanisms for linear objectives to be characterized. The ex
ante optimal mechanism is given by an appropriate ironing of the price-posting payoff curve. The
optimal interim allocation, for any interim allocation constraint, is given by ironing the same
quantiles as the price-posting payoff curve is ironed. The resulting allocation rule x optimizes Φ¯
pointwise and is constant on intervals of values v(q) where Φ¯(q) > Φ(q).
Interim Optimization for Lagrangian Objectives
The difficulty of applying the framework described above is that welfare maximization (also revenue
maximization) with budgeted agents is non-linear (Definition B.1). Our approach prove Lemma B.1
is to consider the optimization program for welfare maximization with budgeted agents, Lagrangian
relax the budget constraint, and observe that the resulting Lagrangian objective is linear. Then,
a characterization of the form of the optimal mechanism for any Lagrangian objective implies the
form of the optimal mechanism for the optimal choice of the Lagrangian parameter. Thus, the
framework above for optimizing linear objectives can be effectively applied to solve the problem of
budgeted agents.
We begin by writing an optimization program for the interim welfare maximization problem
for winner-pays-bid mechanisms. The budget constraint for the winner-pays-bid mechanisms is
p(v) ≤ B x(v) for all v ∈ [0, h] where h is the largest value in the support of distribution F . We
introduce the following lemma to help simplify the budget constraint.
Lemma B.4. Given any interim allocation and payment rule (x, p) in BNE with x(v) > 0 for
v ∈ (v†, h], then the ratio p(v)
x(v) is non-decreasing on (v
†, h].
Proof. By the Myerson (1981) characterization of BNE, the interim allocation rule is non-decreasing
and the payment rule satisfies the payment identity, i.e., p(v) = v·x(v)−
∫ v
0 x(t)dt. Suppose x(v) > 0
for v ∈ (v†, h]. Consider the derivative of the ratio p(v)
x(v) with respect to v,
d
dv
[
p(v)
x(v)
]
=
d
dv
[
v · x(v)−
∫ v
0 x(t)dt
x(v)
]
= 1− 1 +
∫ v
0 x(t)dt
(x(v))2
x′(v) ≥ 0.
Thus, the ratio is non-decreasing in value v from v† to h.
Combining Lemma B.4 and the fact that the budget constraint holds at value v automatically
if the allocation x(v) equal to zero, the budget constraint can be simplified as p(h) ≤ B x(h). We
use Lagrangian relaxation to move the budget constraint into the objective, and get a optimization
program as follows,
max
(x,p)
E[v · x(v)] + λBx(h)− λp(h)
s.t. (x, p) are BIC, IIR,
and feasible.
(3)
To solve this Lagrangian relaxation program, there will be a correct Lagrangian multiplier λ
for which the budget constraint is met with equality. Once the correct value of the Lagrangian
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Figure 6: Depicted are the −λv(q) curve (black dashed), the
∫ q
0 v(t)dt+ λB curve (black dotted),
the Lagrangian welfare curve Vλ(q) (gray solid), and the ironed Lagrangian welfare curve V¯λ(q)
(black solid) corresponding to an agent with value uniformly distributed on [0, 1] with budget
B = 14 and Lagrangian multiplier λ =
2
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multiplier is determined, the welfare-optimal mechanism can be solved using the Lagrangian payoff
curve that corresponds to the Lagrangian welfare E[v · x(v)]+λBx(h)−λp(h). To prove Lemma B.1,
we give a simple characterization of the optimal mechanism for any Lagrangian parameter.
Notice that both surplus, revenue, and the allocation and payments of particular agents are
linear objectives. Thus, for a fixed Lagrangian parameter the Lagrangian welfare optimization is a
linear objective.
Lemma B.5. Given any interim allocation and payment rule (x, p) in BNE, fox any fixed La-
grangian parameter λ, the Lagrangian welfare E[v · x(v)] + λBx(h)− λp(h) is a linear objective.
Proof. By the definition of linearity, the sum of linear objectives and a scalar multiple of a linear
objective are both linear objectives. x(v) is linear for all v, hence, the scalar multiple of allocation
λBx(h), and the expected surplus E[v · x(v)] are both linear objectives. By the payment identity,
the payment is an integral of x(v) and integral is a linear operator, hence, the scalar multiple of
price λp(h) is also a linear objective. Thus, the Lagrangian welfare E[v · x(v)] + λBx(h)− λp(h) is
a linear objective.
Consider optimizing the program (3) for a fixed Lagrangian parameter λ. To apply the frame-
work discussed previously, we first construct the price-posting payoff curve. Notice that the iden-
tified Lagrangian price-posting welfare curve is discontinuous at q = 0 (unless λ = 0, i.e. when the
budget constraint is not binding).
Lemma B.6. The Lagrangian price-posting welfare curve Vλ(·) for a public budget agent satisfies
Vλ(q) =
{
0 if q = 0,∫ q
0 v(q)dq − λv(q) + λB otherwise.
Proof. Consider posting a price v(q) in the quantile space.
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For q > 0 (strictly positive), the price v(q) is strictly less than the highest value v(0) = h, so
p(h) = v(q) and x(h) = 1. Thus, the Lagrangian objective for q ∈ (0, 1] is Vλ(q) =
∫ q
0 v(t)dt −
λv(q) + λB.
For q = 0, an agent with the highest value h is indifferent between buying and not buying. If
this agent buys, the objective is negative; if this agent does not buy, the objective is zero. Per the
definition of the price-posting revenue curve, we break this tie in favor of the objective.
Proof of Lemma B.1. If the budget does not bind, it is optimal to allocate the interim constraint
x⋆(·), since the welfare of any interim feasible allocation is at most the same as the welfare of the
interim constraint.
Next, we assume that the budget binds, i.e., λ > 0. Notice that on q ∈ (0, 1], the Lagrangian
price-posting welfare curve is the constant λB plus the difference between the original welfare
curve
∫ q
0 v(t)dt and the scaled value function λv(q). Since the original welfare curve is always
concave, under the public-budget regularity assumption, this Lagrangian price-posting welfare curve
is concave on q ∈ (0, 1]. Due to the discontinuity at q = 0, and the fact that for sufficient small q > 0,
Vλ(q) is negative, the Lagrangian welfare curve (i.e., solving the ex ante optimization problem) is
the Lagrangian price-posting welfare curve with ironing from 0 to some q† (See Figure 6). Therefore,
by Lemma B.3, the welfare-optimal mechanism allocates as by the interim constraint x⋆(·) except
ironing the top values between v† = v(q†) and h = v(0).
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